Suchergebnisse

The life spans of international organizations (IOs) can take unexpected turns. But when we reduce IO life spans simply to their existence or lack thereof, or to formal change involving the addition of new members or the revision of charters, we miss the subtler dynamics within IOs. A broader continuum of IO life spans acknowledges life, death, inertia, and change as responses to crises, and affords a more nuanced perspective on international cooperation. Through this lens, the setbacks that many IOs are currently experiencing look less extraordinary.

International-relations scholars tend to focus on the formation, design, and effects of international organizations (IOs). However, the vitality of IOs varies tremendously. I argue that IOs end up in one of three situations. They could die off altogether, though this happens infrequently. More commonly, many IOs become "zombies." They continue to operate, but without any progress toward their mandates. A third category includes IOs that are alive and functioning. I develop a theory to explain an organization's vitality, hinging on the quality of the bureaucracy. In an environment where IOs with similar goals, and with many overlapping members, compete for bureaucrats, the ability of the secretariats to attract talented staff and to enact policy autonomously are associated with whether organizations truly stay active, simply endure, or die off. I demonstrate this proposition using a new measure of the vitality of international economic organizations from 1950 to the present. Around 52 percent of the organizations in the sample are alive and functioning, around 10 percent are essentially dead, and nearly 38 percent are zombies. Using these original data, tests of these propositions support the theory.

Regional trade agreements (RTAs) all over the world share many of the same institutional features-from dispute-settlement mechanisms to legalized language to escape clauses-and espouse many of the same goals. But many of those features are unimplemented in different contexts across the world. Many observers have pointed to an 'implementation gap' in RTAs -- most of which promise much but deliver relatively little -- but offer no explanation for this gap. I argue that this is explained by domestic capacity. In countries where the rule of law is weak and infrastructure is insufficient -- and particularly when those elements interact -- it is difficult to implement trade agreements. This article utilizes expert survey data to demonstrate that member states with poor infrastructure and little respect for the rule of law are unable to carry out the obligations they agree to in their trade agreements. Domestic capacity -- both physical and institutional -- can explain the implementation gap between what agreements promise and what they deliver, as well as the variation in the economic performance of these RTAs. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]

Regional trade agreements (RTAs) all over the world share many of the same institutional features—from dispute-settlement mechanisms to legalized language to escape clauses—and espouse many of the same goals. But many of those features are unimplemented in different contexts across the world. Many observers have pointed to an "implementation gap" in RTAs—most of which promise much but deliver relatively little—but offer no explanation for this gap. I argue that this is explained by domestic capacity. In countries where the rule of law is weak and infrastructure is insufficient—and particularly when those elements interact—it is difficult to implement trade agreements. This article utilizes expert survey data to demonstrate that member states with poor infrastructure and little respect for the rule of law are unable to carry out the obligations they agree to in their trade agreements. Domestic capacity—both physical and institutional—can explain the implementation gap between what agreements promise and what they deliver, as well as the variation in the economic performance of these RTAs.

Much of the literature on international institutions argues that membership regularizes expectations about members' future behavior. Using the accession of the postcommunist countries as a test case, this article argues that the EU can send strong signals to financial markets about the trajectory of a particular country. Examining spreads on sovereign debt from 1990 to 2006, this article shows that closing negotiation chapters on domestic economic policy—in other words, receiving a seal of approval from Brussels that previously existing policy reform is acceptable to the wider EU—substantially decreases perceptions of default risk in those countries. That decrease operates independently from policy reform that the country has taken and is also distinct from selection processes (modeled here with new variables, including UNESCO World Heritage sites and domestic movie production, that proxy for cultural factors). Thus, this particular international organization has played an important role in coordinating market sentiment on members, conferring confidence that policy reform alone could not accomplish.

AbstractHow do leaders address the world in service of international cooperation, and do their messages enhance or detract from the global agenda? Leaders increasingly appear at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), a deliberative forum meant for diplomacy, not politics. At the same time, the UNGA has long undergone revitalization efforts, and leaders' contributions could potentially ensure more meaningful cooperation. Building on theories of leader communication, we argue that, in contrast to other country representatives, heads of state have more leeway to deviate from the assembly's priorities; as politicians, they have incentives to discuss their own, more particularistic, topics. Drawing from novel data on leaders' speeches in the UNGA, we use text analytics to show that leaders tend to depart from the policy agenda of the session. Furthermore, national political leaders speak more plainly, centering speech on themselves and departing from the general conventions of diplomatic debate. This suggests that, while leaders' attendance potentially generates more publicity and visibility for the UNGA, their contributions may also undermine the general debate. Our findings shed light on the ways in which leaders can politicize mulitlateral cooperation, and we give evidence for the role of individuals in the vitality of international organizations.

Lorsque des dirigeants politiques mandatent des représentants auprès d'organisations internationales, ces derniers sont souvent censés parler d'une seule et même voix. Or, plusieurs types de représentants de pays interviennent sur la scène internationale, notamment des représentants permanents, mais aussi des délégués plus ouvertement "politiques''. Nous avançons que les représentants permanents auprès des Nations unies ont des perspectives de carrière qui les rapprochent des fonctionnaires et qui les différencie des délégués politiques. En ce sens, ils parlent généralement d'une manière plus homogène que d'autres types d'orateurs et utilisent une rhétorique diplomatique relativement plus technique. En outre, compte tenu de leurs motivations professionnelles, ils sont plus réticents à critiquer l'ONU. En bref, les représentants permanents parlent plus comme des fonctionnaires que comme des politiques. Nous utilisons l'analyse de texte pour étudier les différences dans la rhétorique des représentants à l'Assemblée générale des Nations unies. Nous mettons en évidence des distinctions marquées entre les discours de différents types de représentants. Ces conclusions, en contradiction avec les hypothèses traditionnelles, ont des conséquences sur notre compréhension des interactions entre administration publique et représentation au sein des organisations internationales. Remarques à l'intention des praticiens Les délégations auprès des organisations internationales ne parlent pas ''d'une seule et même voix''. Dans cet article, nous montrons que les représentants permanents auprès des Nations unies ont plus de caractéristiques propres aux fonctionnaires que d'autres représentants d'un même pays. Pour les praticiens, il est important de comprendre que la manière dont certaines catégories d'intervenants internationaux exercent leurs fonctions peut être très distincte. Ces différences de ton —même parmi les représentants d'un même État— peuvent influer sur le processus de négociation et les débats.

When political principals send agents to international organizations, those agents are often assumed to speak in a single voice. Yet, various types of country representatives appear on the international stage, including permanent representatives as well as more overtly "political" government officials. We argue that permanent delegates at the United Nations face career incentives that align them with the bureaucracy, setting them apart from political delegates. To that end, they tend to speak more homogeneously than do other types of speakers, while also using relatively more technical, diplomatic rhetoric. In addition, career incentives will make them more reluctant to criticize the United Nations. In other words, permanent representatives speak more like bureaucratic agents than like political principals. We apply text analytics to study differences across agents' rhetoric at the United Nations General Assembly. We demonstrate marked distinctions between the speech of different types of agents, contradictory to conventional assumptions, with implications for our understandings of the interplay between public administration and agency at international organizations.Points for practitionersDelegations to international organizations do not "speak with one voice." This article illustrates that permanent representatives to the United Nations display more characteristics of bureaucratic culture than do other delegates from the same country. For practitioners, it is important to realize that the manner in which certain classes of international actors "conduct business" can differ markedly. These differences in tone—even among delegates from the same principal—can impact the process of negotiation and debate.

When political principals send agents to international organizations (IOs), those agents are often assumed to speak in a single voice. Yet various types of country representatives appear on the international stage including permanent representatives as well as more overtly "political" government officials. We argue that permanent delegates at the United Nations face career incentives that align them with the bureaucracy, setting them apart from political delegates. To that end, they tend to speak more homogeneously than do other types of speakers, while also using relatively more technical, diplomatic rhetoric; and career incentives will make them more reluctant to criticize the UN. In other words, permanent representatives speak more like bureaucratic agents than like political principals. We apply text analytics to study differences across agents' rhetoric at the UN General Assembly. We demonstrate marked distinctions between the speech of different types of agents, contradictory to conventional assumptions, with implications for our understandings of the interplay between public administration and agency at IOs.